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hopes that Taiwan’s counterintelligence
efforts are indeed that good, but readers
probably recall that the John Walker spy
ring operated for over fifteen years in the
United States during the Cold War, causing enormous harm. Doubtless, Taiwan
works hard to catch spies—as did the
Federal Bureau of Investigation during
the Cold War—but it just does not
seem credible that Taiwan is immune
to effective Chinese espionage efforts.
Readers also might be forgiven for
doubting the author’s claim of Chinese
counterintelligence ineptitude if recent
reports in the press describing Beijing’s
destruction of Central Intelligence
Agency networks in China are accurate.
The perils inherent in the book’s
analytical tilt in favor of Taiwan extend
to other areas, perhaps most critically
to the author’s assessment (which relies
on some of his previous, similar work)
that the threat that China’s conventional
missile force and counterair systems
pose to Taiwan’s air force and navy is
manageable. This is important because
if this conclusion is wrong Taiwan’s
exposure to Chinese bombardment
and blockade, and even invasion, is
far higher than the author asserts.
This vulnerability—which depends on
whether Chinese long-range precision
strikes can be effective against Taiwan’s
defenses—will remain a critical factor
in Taiwan’s ability to deter or withstand
Chinese uses of force. The implications
of this competition extend far beyond
Taiwan. This work would be better
if it had addressed this issue more
thoroughly. Another subject that falls in
this category of insufficient treatment
is China’s ability to use its maritime
militia during an invasion of Taiwan.
Nonetheless, there is value in this
book. Its sources, and the author’s
background and experiences, provide a
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basis for optimism regarding Taiwan’s
ability to resist an invasion, which
the author relates enthusiastically.
WILLIAM S. MURRAY

Congress Buys a Navy: Politics, Economics, and
the Rise of American Naval Power, 1881–1921, by
Paul E. Pedisich. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2016. 304 pages. $39.95.

The subject of Paul E. Pedisich’s newest
work, Congress Buys a Navy: Politics,
Economics, and the Rise of American
Naval Power, 1881–1921, is apparent
from its title. Pedisich proposes that it
was Congress—rather than the executive branch—that was most directly
responsible for funding and building
the U.S. Navy during this pivotal period.
This well-researched work considers
four decades of presidential actions,
congressional legislation, and USN
policy and their role in the buildup of
U.S. naval power and capabilities.
These four decades (1881–1921) are
in many ways the most important in
U.S. naval history and development,
spanning the aftermath of the Civil War
through the end of the First World War.
At the beginning of this period, Pedisich
demonstrates the relative feebleness of
the U.S. Navy in comparison with European naval powers, most notably Great
Britain. However, this study demonstrates how the efforts of nine presidents
and their cabinets, sixteen Secretaries
of the Navy, and innumerable members
of Congress were able to transform the
U.S. Navy from a neglected, presteel,
and defensively focused organization
into—in the aftermath of World War
I—the world’s premier naval power.
Pedisich’s study is notable for its focus
on the legislative branch’s central place
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in developing the nation’s maritime
power and naval war-fighting capabilities. Consequently, it should be noted
that this work is not a study of naval
warfare, tactics, or strategy. Rather,
Pedisich’s extensive research of the
congressional sources explores the
personal and political negotiations and
decisions, and the attendant legislation
and congressional appropriations,
that in essence “built” this new Navy
over the course of four decades.
Perhaps this book’s greatest strength
is as a catalog of the wealth of
primary-source material from which
Pedisich drew: personal and private
correspondence, political speeches, and
military and congressional records.
The book is also rich in a level of detail
that constitutes a microhistory of the
period’s naval and congressional politics.
One thing readers will not be lacking
after reading this book is information.
Yet Congress Buys a Navy has numerous
weaknesses. Perhaps the most obvious is
a lack of clear purpose. While this work
extensively chronicles naval politics in
Washington—including congressional
appropriations, arguments, voting
records, and political maneuvers—as
well as decisions from the various Navy
Secretaries and the rest of the executive
branch, it falls short in providing the
larger historical contextualization for
making sense of this plethora of specific
information. Furthermore, Pedisich
does not explain the meaning of this
massive data dump in any conclusive
manner. Most significantly, Pedisich’s
overall assessment of this period is
uncertain: Did the Navy (and the
United States) need more funding?
Less? The reader is left uncertain.
Despite Pedisich’s richness of detail,
his assessment of the specific processes that transformed the Navy from
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a weak, presteel force into a premier
fighting force remains ambiguous.
Despite Pedisich’s attention to
consecutive legislatures, congressional
appropriations, funding, and various
Secretaries of the Navy and politicians,
he does not give the reader regular,
intermediate updates regarding the
exact strength and capability of the Navy
for this period. Occasionally, Pedisich
does draw attention to numerical values
of naval forces, but when he does he
offers little in the way of explanation
of the lethality and functionality of the
Navy. As a result, the reader may be
disappointed at the lack of details on
the status of naval forces, such as ships
in use and those under construction.
Absent a consistent and overarching
metanarrative, the book ultimately reads
more as a collection of case studies
on congressional processes and as
an encyclopedic compilation of attendant economic and political facts
and statistics—all perhaps of lesser
interest to armchair naval historians.
However, Congress Buys a Navy is
a thoroughly researched work that
warrants accolades for highlighting
the key role that Congress played
in creating a modern U.S. Navy.
BLAKE I. CAMPBELL

Everything under the Heavens: How the Past Helps
Shape China’s Push for Global Power, by Howard
W. French. New York: Knopf, 2017. 352 pages.
$27.95.

As a journalist who has done his
historical research, Howard W. French
has produced a highly readable book
that probes the Chinese concept of tian
xia, roughly meaning China’s “natural
dominion over everything under
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